In 1962, Prospero T. Stella published editions of a series of three questions collectively entitled "Quaestiones de libero arbitrio" and composed by Durandus of St.-Pourçain probably while he was regent master in theology at Paris holding the French Dominican chair in 1312 or 1313.
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1
Of the three questions in the treatise only one will concern us here: the third, in English translation "whether there can be at once in the same free power several acts of understanding or of willing, of which one is the eff ective source of the other".
2 Durandus's short answer to this question is: no, there can in fact be one and only one intellectual or voluntary act at a time. Not everyone agreed with Durandus's point of view on this issue, and one of the great services that Stella provided in his 1962 article was to edit a direct response to Durandus russell l. friedman by Th omas Wylton", 3 the debate between Durandus and Wylton and its aft ermath has, to my knowledge, remained unstudied in the forty years since it was uncovered by Stella. In the fi rst part of this paper I'll briefl y present main arguments of these two scholars on this issue. In the second, longer part of the paper I want to sketch some contexts in which this debate between Durandus and Wylton surfaces, focusing most on the issue of our enjoyment ( fruitio) of God, in which there was considerable and varied reaction to Durandus's view in particular. Th us, this article is an exercise in map-making: I'm following the trail of this philosophical debate, connecting some as yet unconnected dots, although by no means in an exhaustive fashion. With that caveat, we can turn fi rst briefl y to Durandus, then to Th omas Wylton.
Durandus's argumentation for the view that there cannot be more than one act in the intellect at any one time is complex and lengthy. I cannot do it justice in the space available. But I won't be doing it an injustice to say that the major principle behind Durandus's view is that each and every intellectual act is totally incompossible with each and every other intellectual act, and so two cannot be in the same intellect at the same time.
4 Just as it is plainly absurd to say that two contrary accidents, hot and cold, white and black, can be in precisely the same subject at precisely the same time in precisely the same way, so it is with intellectual acts. In some cases, according to Durandus, this is easy to see: we cannot think contradictories, x and ~x, at the same time;
5 Durandus merely generalizes the principle: every intellectual act
3 Documenti e studi sulla tradizione fi losofi ca medievale 9 (1998), pp. 341-379. In addition, see my forthcoming article "Mental Propositions before Mental Language", in Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge classique, ed. J. Biard et al., Leuven, forthcoming.
4 Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Quaestiones de libero arbitrio, q. 3, ed. Stella, p. 491,37-41: "Sub quocumque genere est invenire diff erentias et incompossibiles species; species sub eodem genere disparatae sunt incompossibiles, quia inter omnes est aliqua contrarietas, licet adeo non perfecta, ut patet de albo et nigro et coloribus mediis. Sed inter intellectiones est dare contrarias et incompossibiles. Ergo pari ratione omnes aliae intellectiones sunt incompossibiles". For literature on Durandus, see below, note 17.
